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Abstract
Objective To examine the reasons why practices exempt patients from
the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme
(exception reporting) and to identify the characteristics of general
practices associated with informed dissent.
Design Retrospective analysis.
Setting Data for 2008-9 extracted from the clinical computing systems
of general practices in England.
Participants 8229 English family practices.
Main outcome measures Rates of exception reporting for 37 clinical
quality indicators, associations of patient and general practice factors
with exception rates, and financial gain for practices relating to their use
of exception reporting.
Results The median rate of exception reporting was 2.7% (interquartile
range 1.9-3.9%) overall and 0.44% (0.14-1.1%) for informed dissent,
but variation in rates was wide between practices and across indicators.
Common reasons for exception reporting were logistical (40.6% of
exceptions), clinical contraindication (18.7%), and patient informed
dissent (30.1%). Higher rates of informed dissent were associated with:
higher numbers of registered patients, higher levels of local area
deprivation, and failure of the practice to secure maximum remuneration
in the previous year. Exception reporting increased the cost of the
scheme by £30 844 500 (€36 877 700; $49 053 200) (£0.58 per patient),
with two indicators accounting for a quarter of this additional cost.
Conclusions The provision to exception report enables practices to
exempt dissenting patients without being financially penalised. Relatively
few patients were excluded for informed dissent, however, suggesting
that the incentivised activities were broadly acceptable to patients.
Introduction
Since early 2000 payers across healthcare systems worldwide
have experimented with pay for performance schemes that
explicitly link doctors’ remuneration to quality of care, with
mixed success.
1-3 In the United Kingdom, a national scheme for
primary care—the Quality and Outcomes Framework—was
introduced in 2004, providing financial incentives to family
practices for meeting targets on a range of clinical,
organisational,andpatientexperienceindicators.
4Mostpractices
have performed well under the scheme,
5-8 but improved patient
outcomes have not been consistently evident.
9-11 Even if they
successfully stimulate improved performance, pay for
performance schemes have several potential unintended
consequences. In particular, given a method of remuneration
that financially rewards doctors for performing procedures,
prescribingdrugs,andcontrollingbiologicalvariables,patients
may be coerced or refused care if they are non-compliant.
12 13
Understandingthesepotentialrisks,thedesignersoftheQuality
Outcomes Framework included two mechanisms intended to
protect patients from coercive care. Firstly, upper payment
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RESEARCHthresholds are set below 100%, so practices do not have to
achieve the targets for all patients to receive the maximum
payment. Secondly, doctors are permitted to use their clinical
judgment to remove inappropriate patients from achievement
calculationsforclinicalindicators,aprocessknownasexception
reporting. The box gives permitted reasons for exception
reporting, including logistical considerations (for example,
recent registration of the patient with the practice), clinical
reasons (for example, a contraindication to treatment), and
patientinformeddissent(thatis,notagreeingtotheinvestigation
or treatment). Patients recently registered with the practice or
with a recent diagnosis are automatically excepted by clinical
computing systems, whereas practices must actively identify
patients who meet other exception reporting criteria. The
provision to except dissenting patients is intended to counter
any financial conflict of interest for doctors in respecting a
patient’schoicetorefuseaninterventionincentivisedunderthe
scheme.
The principal drawback of exception reporting is that it allows
practices to receive the maximum remuneration without
necessarilyprovidingtherequiredcareforalleligiblepatients.
14
If exception rules are applied too readily or inappropriately,
highachievementscoreswillmasksuboptimalcare.
4 15Todate,
overall exception reporting rates have generally been low (less
than6%),
16withlittleevidenceofwidespreadfraud.
17However,
a few practices have achieved high scores by excluding
unusually large numbers of patients.
18 19 Concerns over
inappropriate use of exception reporting have led to calls for
the provision to be amended.
20 Without the ability to exception
report, practices could be penalised for respecting the wishes
of dissenting patients, particularly in localities where rates of
dissent are high. Recent qualitative work suggests that doctors
perceive exception reporting to be an important, defensible
safeguard against inappropriate or over treatment of patients.
21
However, to date no research has been carried out into the
reasonswhypracticesexceptionreportpatientsandinparticular
how high rates of patient dissent are for different population
groups. We examined the reasons given by practices for
exception reporting patients and identified patient and practice
characteristics associated with informed dissent.
In 2008-9 the Quality and Outcomes Framework consisted of
127 quality indicators, of which 65 covered the maintenance of
diseaseregisters,organisationalactivities,andpatientexperience
of care. The remaining 62 indicators covered clinical activities
across 15 clinical areas, for which practices are permitted to
exception report patients for specified reasons (box). Practices
areexpectedtosatisfycertaincriteriabeforeexceptionreporting
patients. For exceptions due to informed dissent, practices are
requiredtomakepersonalcontactwiththepatientandtorecord
the patient’s reasons for rejecting the intervention in the notes.
Practices are awarded points based on the proportion of
appropriate patients (that is, those not exception reported) for
whom targets are achieved, between a lower achievement
thresholdof40%andanupperthresholdthatvariesbyindicator
(table1⇓).Themaximumnumberofpointsawardedalsovaries
by indicator. In 2008-9 each point earned practices £126,
adjusted for the relative prevalence of the disease and the size
of the practice population. Practice performance is monitored
by primary care trusts, which have the power to audit patient
records and to investigate the use and misuse of exception
reporting.
Methods
We carried out a retrospective study of exception reporting by
English general practices in 2008-9, identifying practice and
population predictors of exception reporting rates through
multilevel multivariate linear regression.
Data sources
We used data from the Quality Management and Analysis
System (QMAS), the national information system supporting
theQualityandOutcomesFramework,publishedbytheNational
Health Service Information Centre. The Quality Management
and Analysis System holds publicly available data on the
achievement of indicators for 8229 English practices (over
99.9% of all practices). Detailed information on exception
reporting (including reason for exception) is not publicly
reported and we specifically acquired the relevant dataset for
this study. Data on patient and practice characteristics were
obtained from the Office for National Statistics website
22 and
theGeneralMedicalServicesdatabase.Practicesweregrouped
into fourths on the basis of the local level of area deprivation,
using boundary datasets from the UKBORDERS website
23 to
assign index of deprivation scores to practices at the postcode
level.
Data analyses
For each practice and each clinical indicator we calculated the
rate of exception reporting as the number of excepted patients
divided by the number of eligible patients:
ERi=Ei/(Ei+Di)
Where Ei is the number of patients exception reported for that
indicator and Di is the number of patients meeting the criteria
for the indicator and not excepted by the practice. As the
distributions of exception reporting rates are skewed, we report
medians. We calculated the overall rates for a practice (that is,
exception rates across multiple indicators) by summing
exceptions for all indicators and dividing by the sum of eligible
patients. Patients eligible for multiple indicators are double
counted in the overall rates, and these rates therefore represent
the proportion of “opportunities” to perform the incentivised
activity that resulted in an exception report, rather than the
proportion of patients excepted.
We calculated exception reporting rates separately for each of
the main reasons: logistical, clinical (contraindication or
intolerance), clinical (patient unsuitable), and informed dissent.
Under the Quality Management and Analysis System, if the
indicator is met the patient is counted in Di and not in Ei, even
if the patient was previously exception reported—that is, the
patient is not counted as having been exception reported. In
addition, the Quality Management and Analysis System only
records one exception reporting reason for each patient. For
patients who satisfy two or more criteria, the first criterion
encountered in the business rules is recorded (see appendix on
bmj.com).
Wealsoestimatedtheaveragefinancialgain(Gi)fromexception
reporting, following a previously published method.
16 For each
indicator in each practice this is calculated as the difference
between the estimated remuneration received and the
remuneration that would have been received had the practice
not excepted any patients (see appendix on bmj.com).
Because patterns of exception reporting differ according to the
type of activity,
16 we classified indicators into three categories:
measurement (for example, monitoring blood pressure levels),
treatment (for example, prescribing β blockers), and outcomes
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Logistical
The patient has recently received a diagnosis or recently registered with the practice†
A specified investigative service is unavailable to the practice
Clinical—contraindication or intolerance
The patient has had an allergic or other adverse reaction to a specified drug or has another contraindication to the drug
The patient has not tolerated the drug
The patient is taking the maximal tolerated dose of a drug, but the levels remain suboptimal
Clinical—patient unsuitable
The indicator is judged inappropriate for the patient because of particular circumstances, such as terminal illness or extreme frailty‡
The patient has a supervening condition that makes the specified treatment clinically inappropriate
The patient has received at least three invitations for a review during the preceding 12 months but has not attended
Informed dissent
The patient refuses to be reviewed‡
The patient does not agree to a specific investigation or treatment§
*Not all reasons are available for every indicator—for example, there is no “contraindication” option for indicators relating
to measuring biological variables
†The definition of “recent” is three months in the case of measurement indicators (for example, measurement of blood
pressure) and nine months in the case of treatment and outcomes indicators (for example, control of blood pressure within
target levels)
‡Patient is excluded for the whole clinical domain (for example, all diabetes indicators)
§Patient is excluded for this activity across all clinical domains (for example, measurement of blood pressure)
(for example, controlling blood pressure levels). For 25
indicators (see supplementary table on bmj.com), including all
treatment indicators, the Quality Management and Analysis
System does not differentiate between patient refusal of
treatment and clinical contraindications, rendering some
exceptionsnon-ascribable.Theseindicatorswereexcludedfrom
all analyses relating to reasons for exception reporting.
Exception reporting rates were analysed for the remaining 37
indicators (table 1), by category and by reason for exclusion.
Sensitivity analyses based on the excluded indicators are given
in the appendix on bmj.com.
Weusedtwomultilevelmixedeffectsmultiplelinearregression
models to identify indicator, practice, and population
characteristics as predictors of overall and of patient informed
dissent exception reporting rates. The structure of the data was
three level, with indicators crossed with practices and nested
within primary care trusts. To account for this structure and to
model variability at each level, we used mixed effects models
with the xtmixed command in Stata. Owing to computational
limitations, models of indicator variability (both fixed and
random effects) failed to converge, hence we used a three level
model with indicator observations nested within practices and
practices nested within primary care trusts. We assessed
collinearity by estimating variance-inflation factors for the
independent variables. All factors were in the range 1.0 to 2.1,
below the conservative threshold for collinearity. All statistical
comparisons were made at an α level of 5%. Stata v11.1
software was used for all analyses.
Results
Rates of exception reporting
In 2008-9 the median exception reporting rate across all 62
clinical indicators was 4.5% (interquartile range 3.4-5.8%).
Median rates for individual indicators ranged from 0.0% (for
seven indicators) to 24.4% (CHD 10: β blocker therapy for
patients with coronary heart disease) (table 1). Rates were
generallylowerformeasurementindicators(median2.4%)than
for treatment and intermediate outcomes indicators (median
10.0% and 5.7%, respectively).
The median exception rate across the 37 indicators for which
reasons for exception reporting were ascribable was 2.7%
(interquartile range 1.9-3.9%). Figure 1⇓ gives the proportions
of patients excepted for each indicator. Logistical exceptions
were used most frequently (40.6% of exceptions) and clinical
contraindications least frequently (7.6% of exceptions, table
2⇓). Logistical exceptions were particularly common for
indicators involving referrals to other agencies or complex
assessments for patients with a new diagnosis—for example,
diagnosisofatrialfibrillationconfirmedbyspecialistassessment
(AF 4), assessment of the severity of depression (DEP 2), and
confirmation of stroke by further investigation (STR 13).
Informed dissent accounted for 37.4% of measurement
exceptions, 21.9% of intermediate outcomes exceptions, and
30.1% of exceptions overall. The median exception rate for
informed dissent across all 37 indicators was 0.44%
(interquartile range 0.14-1.1%), but a minority of practices had
considerablyhigherrates:10%ofpracticesexceptedover2.2%
of patients for informed dissent and 1% of practices excepted
over 5.7%. Median rates for individual indicators ranged from
0.0% (25 of the 37 indicators) to 1.2% (DM 20: patients with
diabetes with HbA1C levels ≤7.5%, table 1).
The estimated median rate of informed dissent across the 25
indicatorsexcludedfromthemainanalysiswasbetween0.73%
(assuming no non-ascribable exceptions were due to informed
dissent)and4.8%(assumingallnon-ascribableexceptionswere
due to informed dissent, see appendix on bmj.com). Based on
these assumptions, the overall median rate of informed dissent
for all 62 clinical indicators was between 0.53% (interquartile
range 0.18-1.3%) and 1.7% (1.2-2.5%).
Factors associated with exception reporting
Table 3⇓ gives the results of the regression analyses for the 37
indicators for which reasons for exception reporting were
ascribable. Higher overall exception reporting rates were
associated with lower payment thresholds, higher points values
(maximum remuneration), and lower numbers of eligible
patients.Aftercontrollingforotherfactors,exceptionreporting
ratesdidnotdiffersignificantlybetweenintermediateoutcomes
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exceptionreportingpreviouslynotedformeasurementindicators
may therefore be attributable to characteristics such as their
generallyhighupperpaymentthresholdsandlowpointsvalues.
Ratesofexceptionreportingvariedwithpracticecharacteristics:
higher rates were associated with younger age profiles of
doctors, failure to secure maximum remuneration on that
indicatorinthepreviousyear,andahighernumberofregistered
patients.Higherrateswerealsoassociatedwithpatientandlocal
area characteristics—for example, higher levels of local area
deprivation. Most of these effects were small. The most
influential factor was previous performance on the pay for
performancescheme:practicesthatfailedtoacquireallavailable
pointsforaspecificindicatorinthepreviousyear(2007-8)had,
on average, exception reporting rates 2.3% higher than those
that succeeded. With respect to area deprivation, median
exception reporting rates across the 37 indicators varied from
2.6% (interquartile range 1.6-3.7%) for practices in the most
affluent fourth to 2.9% (2.0-4.2%) for practices in the most
deprived fourth.
Factors associated with higher levels of informed dissent
exceptions were broadly comparable with those for overall
exceptions, but effect sizes tended to be smaller and were
non-significantinsomecases.Withrespecttoareadeprivation,
median exception reporting rates for informed dissent varied
from0.42%(0.15-1.0%)forpracticesinthemostaffluentfourth
to 0.45% (0.14-1.3%) for practices in the most deprived fourth.
Financial gain associated with exception
reporting
By removing patients from the denominator for achievement
calculations,exceptionreportingincreasedapractice’sreported
achievement rate. If a practice’s achievement rate before
exception reporting was below the upper payment threshold,
then exception reporting would also increase remuneration.
Figure 2⇓ shows the remuneration practices received for each
of the 62 clinical indicators attributable to achieving the clinical
targets and to exception reporting. For most indicators the cost
of exception reporting was relatively low, as most practices
exceeded the upper payment thresholds even before exception
reporting was taken into account.
Indicators ordered by remuneration
attributable to exception reporting
Overall, 5.4% of clinical points scored by practices—and
thereforeremunerationreceived—wasattributabletoexception
reporting.Thisequatestoabout£30844500(€36877700;$49
053 200) for all English practices, £3834 for the average
practice, and £0.58 per patient. Mean gain ranged from £3586
per practice in the most affluent fourth to £4093 in the most
deprived fourth. The cost of exception reporting varied widely
by indicator, from £1630 for DM 11 (recording the blood
pressureofpatientswithdiabetes)to£4.5mforDEP2(assessing
the severity of depression). Just two of the 62 indicators, DEP
2andMH9(reviewingphysicalandsocialcareforpeoplewith
psychotic illness), accounted for £8.4m—over a quarter of the
total cost associated with exception reporting.
For the 37 indicators for which reasons for exception reporting
wereascribable,4.9%ofremunerationreceivedwasattributable
to exception reporting (£19 188 917 for all English practices,
£2386 for the average practice, and £0.36 per patient). Out of
this total, the gain attributable to informed dissent exceptions
was £2 406 500 nationally, £300 per practice and £0.05 per
patient. Mean gain ranged from £244 per practice in the most
affluent fourth to £351 in the most deprived fourth. The cost of
informed dissent exceptions was relatively low because most
applied to measurement indicators, which attract less
remuneration.
Discussion
Respecting a patient’s decision to refuse an investigation or
treatment, even if the decision is considered wrong or irrational
bytheattendingclinician,iscentraltomedicalprofessionalism
24
and a legal requirement in most circumstances. By making
incomes partly dependent on patient compliance, pay for
performance schemes bring a clinician’s financial self interest
into conflict with their duty not to pressure patients to accept
medical advice. This can have unintended consequences—for
example, under California’s primary care pay for performance
scheme, some practices forced the disenrollment of
non-compliant patients,
13 and in a national survey, US primary
care physicians identified performance measures as a driver of
moreaggressivepractice.
25UndertheUKQualityandOutcomes
Framework, dissenting patients are removed from payment
calculations, making the quality targets fairer for practitioners
andprovidingsomeprotectionfromcoercionforpatients.
21Our
paper suggests that rates of informed dissent in the UK scheme
are low, with little variation in rates across the spectrum of
deprivation.
Strengths and limitations of the study
This is the first study to examine the reasons used by practices
forexceptionreportingpatientsundertheQualityandOutcomes
Framework, and in particular the use of the informed dissent
criterion. The study is subject to several limitations. Firstly,
practices might not record all expressions of informed dissent
for several reasons—for example, if the practice has exceeded
theupperpaymentthresholdfortheyearorifanotherexception
reporting criterion applies for a given patient. In the absence of
other permissible reasons for excluding patients, rates of
informed dissent would possibly be higher than we report.
Secondly,thecentralQualityManagementandAnalysisSystem
database only records the first exception reporting reason
encountered in the business rule algorithm for each indicator
(see appendix on bmj.com). Our figures will therefore
underestimate the true extent of informed dissent for indicators
where dissent codes appear later in the algorithm. Finally, we
were unable to analyse in detail the reasons for exclusion for
25indicators.Ratesofinformeddissentmaybehigherforthese
indicators (see appendix on bmj.com), but precise figures can
only be determined by auditing individual practices.
Patterns of exception reporting
As with previous studies,
16 26 we found that overall rates of
exception reporting were generally low but varied widely by
indicator. Examining the reasons used to exception report
patientsprovidesadditionalinsights.Forexample,theunusually
high number of exceptions for certain measurement indicators
(such as confirmation of stroke diagnosis) were mainly
logistical,pointingtopotentialproblemswithaccesstospecialist
servicesandthetimescalesallocatedtothesequalityindicators.
Even greater variation existed between indicators in the costs
associatedwithexceptionreporting:over£8m(27%ofthetotal
cost) was attached to just two indicators (reviewing patients
withpsychoticillnessandassessingtheseverityofdepression).
Itisnotablethatthelatterindicatorprovedunworkableformany
doctors and was recommended for removal from the scheme
by the Quality and Outcomes Framework advisory committee
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2012;344:e2405 doi: 10.1136/bmj.e2405 (Published 17 April 2012) Page 4 of 11
RESEARCHof the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in
2011.
27
Lowerexceptionreportingrateswereassociatedwithindicators
forwhichupperpaymentthresholdswerehigh.Thesethresholds
were intended to represent what is maximally attainable by the
averagepractice,andtheythereforereflecttheanticipatedlevel
of difficulty of indicators. Fewer patients were therefore
excepted for indicators perceived to be less challenging to
achieve—for example, most measurement indicators. Some
practice characteristics, such as list size, were also associated
with exception reporting rates, despite having no direct bearing
on patient eligibility for exception reporting. Fraudulent or
inappropriate activity is one possible explanation for these
relations, particularly given that practices that fail to achieve
maximum remuneration in one year except more patients the
followingyear,afindingnotedinpreviousyearsofthescheme.
19
Although monitoring of exception reporting by primary care
trustsmayhavediscouragedgrossmisuseanddrivenexception
reporting rates down, the frequency and thoroughness of
monitoringvariesacrosstrusts,
28andlowlevelmisusemayhave
gone undetected. However, it is also possible that propensity to
legitimately except patients or thoroughness in documenting
exceptions is related to certain practice characteristics. For
example, larger practices tend to be better organised
29 and may
therefore be better at identifying patients who should be
excepted.Conversely,practiceswithlargerdiseaseregistersfor
agivenlistsizemayhavedetectedmorepatientswithlesssevere
disease, who may be less likely to meet exception reporting
criteria. Nevertheless, our findings raise the possibility of
gaming,andasfinancialincentiveschemesrelyonaccurateand
honest reporting of performance this issue warrants further and
more direct investigation than we have provided in this paper.
Characteristics of patients attending practices were also
associated with exception reporting rates. Practices located in
moredeprivedareastendedtoexceptmorepatients,bothoverall
andforreasonsofinformeddissent.Giventhatpatientsexcepted
for informed dissent are effectively drawn from a subset of
patients not excepted for other reasons, it is possible that the
relation between deprivation and informed dissent would be
strongerintheabsenceofotherreasonsforexceptionreporting.
There has been concern that high levels of exception reporting
in practices serving deprived populations may be disguising
unmet need.
26 Our findings suggest that the differences in
exception reporting rates attributable to deprivation, although
significant, are small. This could therefore be seen in a more
positive light as doctors in more deprived areas, where health
literacy is likely to be more limited, seem to be listening to and
respondingappropriatelytopatients’concernsaboutincentivised
procedures.Thispotentialexplanationresonateswiththeviews
of family doctors,
21 but further qualitative work is needed to
explore these hypotheses in more detail. In contrast, financial
“gains” from exception reporting varied substantially with
deprivation. Practices in more deprived areas tended to have
lower achievement rates for the clinical indicators and so were
more likely to achieve below the upper payment thresholds and
therefore to benefit financially from excepting patients.
Conclusions and policy implications
Under the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework variations in
exception reporting rates and associated costs are wide, both
between practices and across indicators, which require further
investigation and careful monitoring. The high exception rates
for certain quality indicators also raise questions for policy
makersabouttheappropriatenessoftheseindicatorsandwhether
the current exception reporting system is being used
appropriatelytodealwiththepotentialunintendedconsequences
of financial incentives.
Exception reporting does, however, provide some protection
from inappropriate and coercive treatment of patients whose
providers are subject to financial incentives. Relatively few
patients are excepted for reasons of informed dissent in the
United Kingdom, which suggests that activities incentivised in
the scheme are broadly acceptable to patients (although this
doesnotimplyapprovaloftheincentiveschemeitself).Itcould
bearguedthat dissentisso uncommonthataspecificexception
reporting provision is not required, as long as upper thresholds
are set below 100%. However, removing the provision might
subject a substantial minority of patients attending practices
performing below the upper payment thresholds to coercion.
Thousands of patients expressed their wish not to receive
interventions under the framework (for example, over 100 000
patients with asthma actively declined a review). At relatively
low cost, the provision to exception report enables patients’
voices to be heard and counters some of the critiques of the
scheme as endangering the doctor-patient relationship.
30
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RESEARCHTables
Table 1| Quality and Outcomes Framework clinical indicators included in main analysis (n=37)
Median exception rate
(interquartile range) (%) % excepted No of exceptions
Maximum
points
available
Upper
payment
threshold
Indicator
type Description
Indicator (No of
eligible patients) Total
Informed
dissent Total
Informed
dissent Total
Informed
dissent
Atrial fibrillation:
10.0 (0.0-20.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 13.7 0.1 12 200 103 10 90 Measure Newly diagnosed with
record of ECG or specialist
confirmed diagnosis
AF 4 (89 230)
Asthma:
0.0 (0.0-1.6) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 2.5 2.1 6731 5489 6 80 Measure Record of smoking status
(ages 14-19)
AST 3 (266 871)
2.0 (0.9-5.0) 0.2 (0.0-2.1) 5.1 3.3 161 486 106 734 20 70 Measure Asthma review AST 6 (3 191 842)
6.7 (2.3-12.3) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 8.3 1.1 24 299 3308 15 80 Measure Measures of variability or
reversibility (new
diagnoses, age ≥8)
AST 8 (292 139)
Hypertension:
0.5 (0.2-1.2) 0.1 (0.0-0.6) 1.0 0.6 72 803 44 326 20 90 Measure Record of blood pressure BP 4 (7 120 728)
3.4 (2.3-5.1) 0.3 (0.0-0.9) 4.0 0.9 288 092 62 427 57 70 Outcome Blood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg
BP 5 (7 119 579)
Cancer:
0.0 (0.0-0.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 1.4 0.2 1963 302 6 90 Measure Patient review within six
months of diagnosis
CAN 3 (137 921)
Coronary heart
disease:
0.6 (0.0-1.5) 0.0 (0.0-0.6) 1.0 0.5 19 546 9433 7 90 Measure Record of blood pressure CHD 5 (1 883 107)
2.4 (1.2-4.0) 0.0 (0.0-1.0) 2.9 0.8 55 394 15 056 19 70 Outcome Blood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg
CHD 6 (1 882 959)
1.9 (0.8-3.5) 0.0 (0.0-1.0) 2.6 0.9 49 734 16 746 7 90 Measure Record of total cholesterol CHD 7 (1 882 998)
Heart failure:
4.5 (0.0-12.5) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 8.2 1.0 9678 1164 6 90 Measure Diagnosis confirmed by
electrocardiogram or by
specialist
HF 2 (117 872)
Chronic kidney
disease:
0.0 (0.0-0.5) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 0.5 0.1 7855 1720 6 90 Measure Record of blood pressure CKD 2 (1 736 280)
6.2 (2.9-11.3) 0.0 (0.0-0.3) 8.1 0.4 140 254 6137 11 70 Outcome Blood pressure ≤140/85
mm Hg
CKD 3 (1 736 709)
Dementia:
5.3 (0.0-11.1) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 7.6 0.3 17 717 750 15 60 Measure Care has been reviewed DEM 2 (232 047)
Depression:
1.8 (1.1-3.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.1) 2.7 0.6 97 001 22 044 8 90 Measure Case finding for patients
with diabetes or coronary
heart disease
DEP 1 (3 656 353)
10.5 (3.4-20.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 12.8 0.2 57 789 717 25 90 Measure Assessment of severity at
outset of treatment
DEP 2 (452 152)
Diabetes:
2.2 (1.0-4.2) 0.6 (0.0-1.9) 3.1 1.5 68 271 32 539 3 90 Measure Record of body mass index DM 2 (2 208 812)
2.2 (1.1-3.7) 0.5 (0.0-1.5) 2.7 1.1 60 682 24 405 3 90 Measure Record of HbA1c or
equivalent
DM 5 (2 208 753)
4.4 (2.8-6.8) 0.8 (0.0-2.1) 5.1 1.6 112 299 34 506 11 90 Outcome HbA1C ≤10% DM 7 (2 208 395)
1.0 (0.3-2.0) 0.3 (0.0-1.2) 1.5 0.9 32 422 19 129 3 90 Measure Record of blood pressure DM 11 (2 208 729)
5.3 (3.3-7.8) 0.9 (0.0-2.3) 6.0 1.8 132 815 38 944 18 60 Outcome Blood pressure ≤145/85
mm Hg
DM 12 (2 208 341)
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Median exception rate
(interquartile range) (%) % excepted No of exceptions
Maximum
points
available
Upper
payment
threshold
Indicator
type Description
Indicator (No of
eligible patients) Total
Informed
dissent Total
Informed
dissent Total
Informed
dissent
4.5 (2.5-7.5) 1.0 (0.0-2.9) 5.6 2.3 116 231 46 817 3 90 Measure Record of testing for
microalbuminuria
DM 13 (2 071 049)
1.8 (0.8-3.4) 0.5 (0.0-1.6) 2.5 1.2 54 211 26 889 3 90 Measure Record of total cholesterol DM 16 (2 208 701)
8.0 (5.3-12.1) 1.2 (0.0-3.2) 9.2 2.5 203 978 54 237 17 50 Outcome HbA1C ≤7.5% DM 20 (2 208 047)
1.5 (0.6-2.8) 0.5 (0.0-1.5) 2.0 1.1 44 472 23 976 3 90 Measure Record of estimated
glomerular filtration rate or
serum creatinine testing
DM 22 (2 208 667)
Epilepsy:
1.3 (0.0-5.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 3.8 1.3 12 461 4400 4 90 Measure Record of seizure
frequency
EPI 6 (326 216)
1.2 (0.0-4.8) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 3.6 1.2 11 728 3984 4 90 Measure Drug review involving
patient or carer, or both
EPI 7 (326 205)
12.5 (4.4-23.9) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 16.1 2.0 52 604 6531 6 70 Outcome Seizure free for past 12
months
EPI 8 (326 149)
Psychotic illness:
0.0 (0.0-0.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 3.0 0.8 1646 447 1 90 Measure Record of serum creatinine
and thyroid stimulating
hormone
MH 4 (55 039)
0.0 (0.0-0.0) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 10.8 5.2 2501 1196 3 90 Measure Patients not attending for
annual review followed-up
within 14 days
MH 7 (23 198)
10.0 (4.2-18.8) 0.0 (0.0-3.6) 14.1 3.5 54 356 13 668 23 90 Measure Patient review and health
promotion advice
MH 9 (386 713)
Smoking:
0.6 (0.4-0.9) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 0.7 0.1 77 197 6699 33 90 Measure Record of smoking status
(patients with coronary
heart disease, stroke,
hypertension, diabetes,
chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, chronic
SMO 3 (11 474
188)
kidney disease, asthma,
schizophrenia, psychosis)
Stroke:
1.0 (0.0-2.5) 0.0 (0.0-0.4) 1.7 0.5 15 440 4493 2 90 Measure Record of blood pressure STR 5 (899 490)
3.7 (1.8-6.1) 0.0 (0.0-0.9) 4.5 0.8 40 640 7021 5 70 Outcome Blood pressure ≤150/90
mm Hg
STR 6 (899 399)
3.3 (1.2-6.3) 0.0 (0.0-1.1) 4.8 1.0 43 458 8844 2 90 Measure Record of total cholesterol STR 7 (899 422)
16.0 (0.0-28.6) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 19.8 1.0 17 809 926 2 80 Measure Referred for further
investigation
STR 13 (90 057)
Hypothyroidism:
0.0 (0.0-0.7) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 0.5 0.1 7038 1927 6 90 Measure Record of thyroid function
tests
THY 2 (1 536 123)
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RESEARCHTable 2| Proportion of exception reports attributable to each exception reporting category, by type of indicator
Type of indicator (%)
Reason for exception report All Intermediate outcome Measurement
2.9 2.2 3.5 Unknown*
40.6 45.9 35.9 Logistical
7.6 16.2 0.0 Clinical—contraindication
18.7 13.8 23.1 Clinical—patient unsuitable
30.1 21.9 37.4 Informed dissent
2 184 811 1 026 076 1 158 735 Total No of exceptions
Based on 37 indicators for which reasons for exception reporting were ascribable (see table 1).
*In these cases a “general” exception was applied to the patient and the exact reason for the exception report is not recorded.
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RESEARCHTable 3| Results of regression analysis—factors associated with exception reporting rates
Informed dissent All exceptions
Variable 95% CI P value Coefficient 95% CI P value Coefficient
Indicator characteristics
−0.02 to −0.02 <0.001 −0.02 −0.10 to −0.09 <0.001 −0.09 Upper payment threshold (per 1% increase)
−0.14 to −0.07 <0.001 −0.10 −0.15 to 0.05 0.321 −0.05 Indicator type (intermediate outcome)
0.00 to 0.00 0.045 0.00 0.11 to 0.11 <0.001 0.11 Maximum points/remuneration available
−0.04 to −0.04 <0.001 −0.04 −0.64 to −0.62 <0.001 −0.63 No of eligible patients (per 100 increase in disease register size)
Practice characteristics
-0.37 to −0.29 <0.001 −0.33 −2.44 to −2.22 <0.001 −2.33 Maximum points scored in previous year (2007/8)*
−0.00 to 0.00 0.449 −0.00 −0.01 to −0.00 <0.001 −0.00 % of doctors aged ≥55†
−0.00 to 0.00 0.054 −0.00 −0.00 to 0.00 0.244 0.00 % of women doctors†
−0.05 to 0.07 0.785 0.01 0.06 to 0.29 0.004 0.17 Personal Medical Services contract
0.06 to 0.08 <0.001 0.07 0.26 to 0.29 <0.001 0.28 No of patients (per 1000 increase in list size)†
Patient and area characteristics
−0.00 to 0.01 0.327 0.00 0.02 to 0.04 <0.001 0.03 % of patients aged ≥65†
−0.02 to 0.01 0.685 −0.00 −0.02 to 0.02 0.987 −0.00 % of female patients†
−0.01 to −0.00 <0.001 −0.01 −0.01 to 0.00 0.197 −0.00 % of patients from ethnic minority groups†
0.00 to 0.00 <0.001 0.00 −0.00 to 0.00 0.178 0.00 Population density in locality†
Material deprivation in locality‡:
— — — — — — 1st fourth (most affluent)
0.02 to 0.18 0.021 0.10 −0.02 to 0.28 0.082 0.13 2nd fourth
0.09 to 0.27 <0.001 0.18 0.27 to 0.60 <0.001 0.44 3rd fourth
0.23 to 0.42 <0.001 0.33 0.51 to 0.87 <0.001 0.69 4th fourth (most deprived)
Based on 37 indicators for which reasons for exception reporting were ascribable (table 1).
*For each specific indicator.
†Data for 2006/7.
‡Measured by index of deprivation 2007.
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Fig 1 Proportion of patients exception reported by indicator and reason, 2008-9. For 37 indicators for which reasons for
exception reporting were ascribable (see table 1). Indicators ordered by type of activity (measurement or outcome) and by
rate of exception reporting attributable to informed dissent
Fig 2 Total remuneration for all practices attributable to achievement of targets and exception reporting, by clinical indicator
(all 62). Total remuneration is based on population achievement rates. Remuneration attributable to achieving targets is
based on reported achievement rates. Remuneration attributable to exception reporting is the difference between total
remuneration and remuneration attributable to achieving targets
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